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The Impact of Speed Limits on 
Recreational Boating in the Lagoon 
of Venice
Speed limits were introduced in the Lagoon of Venice in 
2002 to reduce wave motion, which damages environ-
mentally sensitive areas in the broader Lagoon as well as 
buildings in the city of Venice. In this paper, we estimate 
the welfare losses experienced by recreational boaters as 
a result of the speed limits. We fit a single-site travel cost 
model to a sample of boaters intercepted as they depart 
from or arrive to marinas and launching ramps on the La-
goon. Our Poisson model is corrected for truncation and 
endogenous stratification. We construct three measures of 
the price per trip, which allow us to check the sensitivity 
of models and welfare estimates to possible measurement 
errors in the opportunity cost of time. Our results are ro-
bust to the measure of price used and conservatively peg 
the welfare losses of boaters to €5.2-6.7 million per year. 
Even under conservative assumptions, the welfare losses of 
boaters are sufficiently large that, given current monitoring 
and enforcement of the speed limits, we believe there is a 
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1. Introduction and Motivation1
Speed limits are sometimes imposed on navigational channels and waterways 
for safety reasons, and to protect wildlife, natural resources and structures (Parnell 
and Kofoed-Hansen 2001). Thomas and Stratis (2002) report that in 1989 the state 
of Florida imposed speed limits to avoid disrupting the natural habitat of the Flo-
rida manatee, an endangered species. Speed limits were imposed in 2002 in the 
Lagoon of Venice2, a body of water on UNESCO’s cultural heritage site list, and 
a unique hydrological and ecological system, to reduce wave motion, which is re-
sponsible for damage to historical buildings in the city of Venice, coastal erosion, 
and adverse effects on the Lagoon ecosystem. 
At this time, these restrictions are in place in the navigable waters within 
the jurisdiction of the City of Venice, including shallow water areas (e.g., Bura-
1 Authors’ affiliations: Paolo Rosato, Dipartimento of Ingegneria Civile e Ambientale, Università 
di Trieste and Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Venice; Anna Alberini, Department of Agricultur-
al and Resource Economics, University of Maryland, College Park, and Fondazione Eni Enrico 
Mattei, Venice, e-mail: aalberini@arec.umd.edu; Dimitrios Reppas, Department of Agricultural 
and Resource Economics, University of Maryland, College Park. Valentina zanatta has partici-
pated in this paper in a private capacity.
2 Municipality of Venice, Ordinanza n. 09/2002 of the 2 February 2002; Ordinanza 31/2002 of the 
27 September 2002; Ordinanza 42/2002 of the 15 November 2002.
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no, Cavallino Treporti, Valli di Chioggia, Sant’Erasmo), many of which are hi-
ghly prized for their ecological and environmental quality, but are also heavily 
used by boaters and tourists. The ordinances impose speed limits on motorboats 
exceeding 2.3 meters in length and prohibit access in specified areas, providing 
exceptions for “traditional” boats, which are slower and contribute less to wave 
motion. Natural resource managers are currently evaluating whether these re-
strictions should be extended to neighboring jurisdictions and other parts of the 
Lagoon as well.
When speed limit regulations are proposed, economists would recommend 
that natural resource managers weigh the gains from the regulations against the 
costs imposed on the users of the natural resource system.
Do the speed limit regulations pass the cost-benefit test? In the North and 
South Lagoon, for example, speed limits should help reduce the damage of wave 
motion to environmentally sensitive areas, like barene (shoals), may reduce impacts 
on buildings in Venice proper, and are unlikely to impact in any way commercial 
aquaculture. Recreational boaters, however, may stand to lose from speed limits 
because they limit their enjoyment of the regulated body of water and/or raise the 
cost of using it. 
These costs and benefits have not been quantified before, and, to our knowle-
dge, few studies have examined systematically the gains and losses on the regu-
lated entities and communities of imposing speed limits in other bodies of water. 
Thomas and Stratis (2002) treat the imposition of speed limits as effectively elimi-
nating routes. They fit a model of choice among alternative navigation routes, and 
estimate the welfare loss associated with the elimination of routes rendered use-
less by the speed limit.
Solomon et al. (2004) use the cost of speed limit law enforcement as a proxy 
for foregone development benefits in their benefit-cost analysis of a proposed safe 
minimum standard for the Florida manatee. The benefits of the policy include re-
venue from manatee-related ecotourism, ecological services provided by manatees, 
and the public’s willingness to pay for conservation, which they elicit through a 
contingent valuation survey. 
In this paper, we wish to estimate the losses experienced by recreational boat 
users in the Lagoon of Venice as a consequence of the speed limit, but choose a 
somewhat different approach. Specifically, we estimate a single-site model predic-
ting the number of boating trips into the Lagoon as a function of price per trip 
and other individual characteristics.
The welfare losses of the speed limit are valued by treating the speed limit as 
an increase in the price per trip. This is due to an increase in fuel consumption 
per unit of distance traveled, and by the opportunity cost of the additional travel 
time. Our data come from a survey of recreational boaters intercepted at a total of 
16 privately owned marinas and boat launching ramps on the Lagoon of Venice in 
May-August 2002.
We queried these boaters about the trips of the year 2001 – before the new 
speed limit regulations were implemented. We focus on recreational boaters be-
cause this is a category of Lagoon users whose trips are discretionary and likely 
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to be sensitive to policies that alter the cost of a trip3. We focus on private ma-
rinas and ramps for three reasons. First, there are a total of 35 privately owned 
and operated marinas on the Lagoon waterfront, for a total of 5500 berths, 40% 
of which are on water. On average, each berth generates revenue for about €1200 
a year, for a total of over €6 million euro a year. In addition to paying fees to the 
marinas, individual boaters are estimated to spend about €500-600 a year each di-
rectly for their boating trips. They also invest considerable amounts of money for 
maintenance and repairs. This is, therefore, an important industry that serves an 
important category of recreational users of the Lagoon of Venice. 
Second, most of the privately owned marinas and ramps appear to be located 
near barene, the delicate natural environment and ecological systems at high risk 
of erosion due to the wave motion created by boats. For this reason, the speed 
limits in the Lagoon are particularly stringent in the vicinity of these marinas and 
boat launching points4, implying that boat owners who keep their vessels there 
are likely to bear the full brunt of the speed limits. 
Third, the speed limit regulations may have a large impact on the future de-
velopment of private marinas. Many observers believe that the demand for berths 
will remain strong in the future, if all conditions remain the same. Virtually all of 
this demand will be met by private marinas. Marinas are currently virtually 100% 
occupied, and there are long waiting lists for berths at virtually all of them. Seve-
ral plans have been drafted for building more, which conflict with the regulations 
seeking to reduce wave motion in the Lagoon by limiting boat traffic. These con-
flicts suggests that natural resource managers may wish to weigh boat traffic re-
strictions with the losses in welfare for recreationists (and for the marina industry) 
when making decisions about Lagoon use. 
Because the survey was conducted before the new speed limits went into ef-
fect, we first fit a trip demand function using the current price of a trip. Next, we 
calculate what the price per trip would have been in the presence of the speed 
limits (it would have been higher), and calculate the corresponding welfare chan-
ge. Clearly, our calculations presume that individual tastes were not altered by 
the policy, so that the demand function for trips remains the same. Our results 
are robust to the measure of price used and conservatively peg the welfare losses 
of boaters to €5.2-6.7 million per year. Even under conservative assumptions, the 
welfare losses of boaters are sufficiently large that, given current monitoring and 
enforcement of the speed limits, there is likely to be a strong incentive for boaters 
to disregard the limits. This suggests that the expected reduction in wave motion 
might be realized only with stepped-up enforcement, which in turn adds to the 
cost of the policy. 
3 In addition, the wave motion created by these users is likely to affect primarily the highly 
prized barene in the North Lagoon, with some effects trickling down to the buildings of the 
Venice city center.
4 The speed limits vary across the areas of the Lagoon, ranging from 5 kmh in the narrow canals 
closest to the shoals to 20 kmh in the widest navigation channels in the open Lagoon. 
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the 
survey design and administration and the data. Section III describes the Travel 
Cost Method, derives a model of Lagoon boating trips, and develops the econo-
metric model. Section IV presents the results and the welfare estimates. We offer 
our concluding remarks in Section V.
. The Survey and the Data
A. Characteristics of the Respondents 
We developed a questionnaire eliciting information about boat ownership, use 
and trips into the Lagoon of Venice, and administered it on site at 16 private mari-
na and ramp locations chosen to be geographically representative of the universe 
of Lagoon waterfront facilities and launching points situated on the mainland (a 
total of 35 marinas and/or ramps).
We thus systematically sampled every other marina from the bottom to the 
top ends of the Lagoon borders (i.e., from Chioggia to Jesolo via Marghera and 
Mestre; see Figure A.1 in the Appendix). 
 The questionnaire was administered in person by two interviewers (two ho-
nors students at the University of Padua) trained by the first author of this paper. 
The interviewers were instructed to contact every fifth person for participation in 
the survey if the marina appeared crowded, and virtually every obvious boat ow-
ner/user on the premises on slower days.The interviewers visited the marinas in 
May-August 2002 primarily on weekends (regardless of the weather) from the ear-
ly morning to the late afternoon, so that boaters were intercepted before setting 
out and upon returning from an outing. 
The first part of the questionnaire queries respondents about their boating tri-
ps into the Lagoon, including the total number of trips in the previous year, sites 
visited, travel time, etc.
The second part of the questionnaire investigates the respondents’ boat ow-
nership, boat characteristics (e.g., type, length, and engine power) and the annual 
costs of keeping the boat at a private marina. The third part of the questionnai-
re elicits individual expenditures on trips into the Lagoon, followed by questions 
about the respondents’ demographics and individual characteristics, such as age, 
income, education, etc.
We contacted about 300 persons, for a total of 263 completed interviews. The 
response rate is thus 87.7%. As shown in table 1, the typical respondents is a male 
(72% of the sample) and full-time employed (80% of the sample). Professionals/cle-
rical workers and self-employed persons account for 33.3% and 31.9% of the sam-
ple, respectively, and retired persons account for about 10 percent.
The average age is 45 years. About 48.8% percent of the sample has com-
pleted high school, and 11% has a college degree. The average family size is 3, 
and about 7.6% of the sample volunteer time to environmental organizations or 
initiatives.
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B. Ownership and Type of Boat
The majority of the respondents (88.2%) use their own boats. Regarding boat 
type, over three-quarters of the sample (76.4%) use a fiberglass boat and 10.4% 
uses a rubber dinghy. Traditional wood boats account for only 3% of the sample. 
The boats used by our respondents are generally small (the average length is 6.5 
meters, and the median length is 5.5 meters), relatively new (the average age is 8.5 
years) and powered by good engines (about 86 HP), almost half of which are two-
stroke engines (47.9%). The power of the engine – which, combined with width 
and length, determines the wave motion created by the boat – varies with the 
type of boat. Traditional wood boats, for example, average about 48 HP5, rubber 
dinghies 59, and fiberglass boats 94. 
About 70% of our respondents keep their boats at private marinas, as might be 
expected, since we surveyed persons as they departed from or returned to private 
marinas or ramps. Respondents spend on average €1200 a year to keep their boats 
in private marinas and about €400 a year for maintenance, repairs, and insurance.
5 We calculate this average after excluding one obvious outlier from the subsample of wood 
boats. Had this outlier of 440 Horse Power (HP) been included, the average engine power 
would have been about 104 HP.
Table 1 – Descriptive statistics of the respondents. N=263





Male (dummy) 0.7186 0.4497 0 1 n/a n/a n/a
Age (years) 45.58 10.55 19 73 38 46 54
Full-time employed 
(dummy) 0.7947 0.4039 0 1 n/a n/a n/a
Retired (dummy) 0.1027 0.3040 0 1 n/a n/a n/a
High-school diplo-
ma (dummy) 0.4880 0.4998 0 1 n/a n/a n/a
College degree 
(dummy) 0.1103 0.0980 0 1 n/a n/a n/a
Household size 3.09 0.93 1 6 3 3 4
Household income 




0.076 0.01 0 1 n/a n/a n/a
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C. Boating Trips
The number of annual Lagoon trips ranges from 1 to 70, the average is 9.6, the 
median is 6, the standard deviation is 10.00, and the first and third quartiles are 4 
and 10, respectively. About three-quarters of the sample report taking ten or fewer 
trips per year, and 55% report taking 6 or fewer, suggesting that we should use a 
count data model for these data. There were a total of 202 valid observations for 
this variable. 
We calculated three alternative measures of the cost of a trip into the Lagoon. 
The first is the out-of-pocket cost of the trip, which adds together the cost of tra-
velling from home to the marina, fuel for the boat, food, etc6. The second and 
6 We calculated the out-of-pocket cost of the trip by using the conventional figure of €0.30 per 
kilometer driven from the respondent’s home to the marina. The cost of boat fuel was comput-
ed based on the size and type of the boat, on whether the boat is a planing or a displacement 
boat, and on the power and make of the engine. 
Table 2a – Cost per trip in € before the speed limit policy 






per trip 43.32 33.52 2.22 173.33 17.68 34.00 60.00
Full cost per trip I 
(wage rate) 58.35 38.89 5.50 202.87 28.78 46.92 82.42
Full cost per trip 
II (1/3 of the wage 
rate)
48.45 35.08 3.30 183.08 21.79 39.13 68.16




Min. Max. First quartile Median 
Third 
quartile
Out-of-pocket cost per 
trip 125.45 127.70 2.67 799.06 54.51 111.02 216.44
Full cost per trip I (wage 
rate) 160.14 143.89 6.61 799.06 54.51 115.89 216.44
Full cost per trip II (1/3 
of the wage rate) 137.74 132.88 5.73 755.05 43.83 97.30 177.90
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third are estimates of the full cost of a trip, and are equal to the out-of-pocket cost 
plus the opportunity cost of the time spent on the trip. These were based on the 
assumption that the wage rate is equal to individual annual income divided by 
2000 hours. In one variant of the full cost of the trip, the opportunity cost of time 
is equal to total trip time multiplied by the wage rate. In the other variant, we 
performed the same calculation but – following much of the travel cost literature 
since Cesario (1976) – we assumed the opportunity cost of time to be equal to one-
third of the wage rate. Since the goal of our study is to estimate the welfare loss (if 
any) associated to speed limit regulations, we also calculated the cost and time per 
trip in the presence of the speed limits. 
We were able to calculate these six measures of price per trip (three variants 
with and without speed limits) for a total of 195 respondents. As shown in tables 
2a and 2b, for these persons the average out-of-pocket cost of an excursion into 
the Lagoon ranges from €43 to €125 in the absence and presence of the speed 
limits, respectively. When we factor in the opportunity cost of time, the average 
cost of the trip ranges from €48 to €160. The speed limits raise fuel costs, since 
these boats are extremely fuel-inefficient at low speeds, as well as travel time7. It is 
not, therefore, surprising that the average cost per trip increases significantly with 
the imposition of the new speed limits.
3. The Travel Cost Model
We use the number of Lagoon boating trips in a year to fit a single-site travel 
cost model. The model allows us to estimate the surplus associated with visits at 
the current conditions and the change in surplus due to the speed limits.  
A. The Single-site Travel Cost Model 
In a single-site travel cost method (TCM) model, it is assumed that an indivi-
dual’s utility depends on aggregate consumption, X, leisure, L and trips r to the site:
    (1)
We further assume weak complementarity of trips with exogenously set quali-
ty at the site, q. In other words, ∂ ∂ =U q/ 0 when r = 0 (people do not care about 
the quality of the site if they do not visit it), and r is increasing in q. The individual 
chooses X, L and r to maximize utility subject to the budget constraint:
    (2)
7 Since most of these boats have a flat hull and cannot plane at the low speeds imposed by the 
speed limits, restricting speed raises dramatically their consumption of fuel per kilometer. 
U U X L r q= ( , , ( ))
y w T L r t t X f P d rd+ ⋅ − − +( ) = + + ⋅( ) ⋅1 2
.
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where y is non-work income, w is the wage rate, T  is total time, t1  is travel time to the site, t2  is time spent at the site, f is the access fee (if any), Pd is the cost per kilometer, and d is the distance to the site. The price of the aggregate good X is 
normalized to 18. 
This yields the demand function for trips:
 
(3)
where p w t t f p dr d= +( ) + + ⋅1 2  is the full price of a trip.
We specify a log-linear demand function for trips. We focus on access to the 
Lagoon under the current conditions, and do not attempt to capture the effect on 
demand of changing site quality q. Formally, 
  (4)
Equation (4) becomes an econometric model once (i) r* is interpreted as the ex-
pected number of trips, and (ii) we introduce r, the observed number of trips, whi-
ch is a random variable with expected value equal to r*. To estimate the coefficien-
ts in equation (4), it is necessary to ask a sample of visitors and potential visitors 
to report the number of trips they took in a specified period (year or season), their 
cost per trip pr, plus w, y, and other individual characteristics that might affect the 
demand for visits to the site. Ideally, the price per trip to an alternative site should 
also be included in the model, lest the estimated coefficient on own price per trip 
be biased, the severity of the bias depending on the correlation between the two 
price variables.
Once the demand function has been estimated, the consumer surplus provi-
des an approximation of the welfare associated with visiting the site9. Formally, 
based on equation (4), the consumer surplus is equal to:
(5) 
where r w po0 1 2 0= + +exp( )β β β  and p0  is current price. The consumer surplus 
corresponding to this functional form for the recreational trip demand is the 
8 This model further assumes that travel time and time spent at the site are exogenous, that 
the opportunity costs for time travelling and on-site time are equal to the wage rate, that 
there is no utility or disutility from travelling to the site, and that each trip to the site is un-
dertaken for no other purpose than visiting the site. It also assumes that individuals perceive 
and respond to changes in travel costs in the same way they would to changes in a fee for 
being admitted to the site (Freeman, 2003). Finally, the model assumes that work hours are 
flexible. 
9 Haab and McConnell (2003) argue that since income effects tend to be small, the consumer 
surplus is a good approximation to welfare in recreational demand studies.
r r y w p qr* * , , ,= ( )
r w pr* exp( )= + +β β β0 1 2
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shaded area in Figure 1. The loss of welfare due to the speed limits – the change 




r r , 
where r1  is the expected number of trips when the speed limits are in force, rai-
sing the price of a trip to p1 . We therefore assume that the speed limits do not 
shift the trip demand function10.
Figure 1 – Inverse demand function for trips and surplus (area in grey)
B. Measuring the Opportunity Cost of Time
The model of the previous section assumes that individuals can freely choo-
se their work hours and that they do not derive any utility (or disutility) from 
working. Therefore, if individuals derive no utility from working, the wage rate 
can be used to estimate the opportunity cost (or shadow price) of time. 
10 The speed limits would shift the trip demand function if the existence of the speed limit affects 
utility directly, in addition through changing the price and hence the optimal number of trips. 
We assume that it is not so, but are unable to test this assumption because we do not have 
observations from after the passage of the speed limit regulations. At this time, we only have 
data from before the new speed limits regulations. 
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In recreational demand studies, there is considerable disagreement on how 
to value time spent traveling to and/or on site. Since Cesario (1976), several re-
creation studies have valued time at a about one-third of the wage rate, a fi-
gure originally drawn from the transportation literature and was subsequently 
criticized as arbitrary (Shaw and Feather 1999)11. McConnell and Strand (1981) 
develop a procedure for estimating the value of time directly as a fraction of the 
wage rate, assuming that such proportion is the same for everyone. Smith et al. 
(1983) first impute wage rates for recreationists who do not report them and/or 
are not in the labor force using information from the Current Population Sur-
vey for individuals of similar observable characteristics12, and then systematically 
experiment with using (i) the full wage rate or one-third of it, and (ii) including 
and excluding time on-site. 
As in Smith et al., we run models where time is valued at 33% and 100% of 
the wage rate, respectively. We needed to secure the cooperation of private marina 
owners and boaters, and so we had to omit any questions that might have been in-
terpreted as prying into the respondent’s finances. This ruled out detailed questions 
about the respondent’s occupation, wage, hours worked, secondary job(s), and 
other questions that have been employed in the recent literature to get at the value 
of time. Therefore, we are unable to implement the modeling approach by Bockstael 
et al. (1987), Larson and Shaikh (2001), and Feather and Shaw (1999). We recognize, 
however, that imputing the opportunity cost of time requires dealing squarely with 
two issues. The first is that the opportunity cost of time is higher than the wage rate 
if the individual receives utility from working, and lower if the individual receives 
disutility from working. The second is that many people are required to work a spe-
cified number of hours, which implies a kink in the budget constraint and raises the 
question of what exactly is the opportunity cost of time for these individuals. 
Bockstael, Strand and Hanemann (1987) develop a utility-theoretic model whe-
re trips and other consumption goods have a money price and a time price (in 
that they require time). The model is completed by two budget constraints – the 
income budget constraint and the time budget constraint. The exact specification 
of these constraints depends on whether the individual works a fixed number of 
hours or can choose to work additional hours above and beyond those required 
by the primary job. Only the latter group trades off income for time at the margin 
– the others are either at a corner solution (they do not work) or at the kink of the 
budget constraint (for those who work the exogenous fixed number of hours).
11 The US Department of Transportation (1997, 2003) recently surveyed the literature on valua-
tion of travel time and found a great degree of variation in the value of travel time. For busi-
ness travel, DOT considers 80-120% of the total hourly compensation wage to be a plausible 
range, and recommends a best estimate of 100%. For personal travel, DOT suggests a plausible 
range of 35-90% of pre-tax wages, with a best estimate of 50-70% depending on whether travel 
is local or intercity.
12 This procedure was recently implemented by Hynes et al. (2005) for Irish recreationists using 
labor market information from Eurostat, a general household survey.
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Bockstael et al.’s choice of utility function results in the following trip demand 
functions:
 (6)
for individuals that work a fixed number of hours and
 
 (7)
for individuals that can use their discretionary time to work more hours. In equa-
tions (6) and (7), Y  is the sum of non-work income and the income from working 
the fixed number of hours, T  is time available for discretionary activities (i.e., to-
tal time minus the fixed number of work hours), p1  is the money price of a trip, t1the time it takes, wD  is the wage rate that can be earned by individuals who work in their discretionary time, and q is site quality. Demand equations (6) and (7) are 
estimated using a sample of sports anglers, some of whom hold secondary jobs or 
can otherwise work during their discretionary time. 
Feather and Shaw (1999) propose a theoretical model that allows for flexible 
work hours, over-and under-employment, and then incorporate the shadow va-
lue of time in a choice model of river recreational destination. The model is esti-
mated using data from the National Survey of Recreation and the Environment, 
where respondents were asked, among other things, whether they were curren-
tly employed, and, if so, whether they worked a fixed hour schedule or were 
free to choose their hours. Those respondents who worked for an hourly wage 
rate were asked whether they would be willing to work fewer hours to have 
more free time, and those that were not on a fixed schedule were asked whether 
they would be willing to work fewer hours for a proportionally lower salary in 
order to have more free time.Feather and Shaw find that for people that work 
more hours than they would prefer the shadow wage rate is greater than the 
market wage rate, while the converse is true for people who work fewer hours 
than they would prefer13. 
Larson and Shaikh (2001) lay out the restrictions that must be imposed on the 
parameters of recreational demand functions for them to be consistent with the 
two-budget model where individuals first choose how much time to work and re-
serve for discretionary activities, and then decide how many trips to take to one 
or more recreational sites.
Finally, they discuss the trip demand function in Bockstael et al. (1987), and 
show that the opportunity cost of time can be retrieved as the coefficient on lei-
sure time divided by the coefficient on work income, even for individuals who do 
not have flexibility in their work hours.
13 Hausman et al. (1995) estimate the value of time by including travel time and out-of-pocket 
cost separately in their discrete choice model for Alaska recreationists. 
r Y T p t q= + + + + + +α γ γ β γ β γ γ ε1 2 1 1 2 1 3
r Y T p w T p w t qD D= + + + + + + + +α γ γ β γ β γ γ1 2 1 1 1 1 1 3( ) ( ) ε
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 C. The Econometric Model
We use a Poisson equation to describe boating trips into the Lagoon of Venice. 
This is appropriate because individuals do not report numerous trips (the average 
per year is about 10), so that a continuous distribution would provide a poor ap-
proximation to the observed data. Formally, letting Y denote a count-data variable, 
the probability function for Y implied by a Poisson model is:
(8)
where λ > 0 is the parameter indexing the Poisson distribution. Both the expected 
value and the variance of Y are equal to λ. 






Clearly, λi  is our operational equivalent of r
* . Following equation (4), x is a 
vector of determinants of Lagoon trips, including income, whereas pi  is the price 
per trip faced by the respondent, and β1 and β2 are unknown coefficients. 
Estimation of the parameters in (10) is further complicated by the nature of 
our sample. Because we intercept people on site, (i) the observations are truncated 
from below at one, and (ii) the people that we are more likely to run into are the 
most avid visitors, i.e., those persons with the highest λi s. Accordingly, if we wish 
to estimate the parameters in (10) using the method of maximum likelihood, the 
correct probability function is: 
(11) 
where Pr(•) is the Poisson distribution function (equation (9)), and the subscript i 
has been omitted to avoid notational clutter (Shaw 1988)14.
14 A similar type of adjustment can be implemented if we assume that the underlying distribu-
tion of trips is a negative binomial. Negative binomial distributions are frequently used in ap-
plied work because they relax the assumption implicit in the Poisson model that the expected 
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and the log likelihood function is 
 
(12) 
It is easily shown (see Shaw 1988) that (11) is simplified to the probability fun-
ction of a Poisson variate defined as = −y y 1.  This approach produces population 
estimates of the coefficients (Englin and Shonkwiler 1995)15.
D. Specification of the Econometric Model
In our theoretical model, the demand for trips (equation (4)) should depend 
on the full price of a trip, which includes the opportunity cost of time. Because of 
the data limitations discussed earlier, in this paper we are forced common practice 
and compute the opportunity cost of time in two ways, using the wage rate and 
one-third of the wage rate (Cesario 1976), respectively. Azevedo et al. (2003) point 
out that computing the opportunity cost of time in this fashion is likely to intro-
duce measurement error in the price of a trip, which in turn results in attenuation 
bias (Greene 2003, pp. 83-86). Accordingly, we also run a specification of the model 
where we enter the out-of-pocket cost of a trip and income separately (as in Al-
berini et al., in press, and Hynes et al. 2005).  Finally, it is important to tackle the 
issue of substitute sites. Ideally, the price per trip to an alternative site should be 
included in the model, lest the estimated coefficient on own price per trip be bia-
sed, the severity of the bias depending on the correlation between the two price 
variables.However, it is difficult to identify substitutes to the Lagoon of Venice, so 
we are forced to ignore this variable in our empirical work16.
lem known as overdispersion (i.e., the variance of trips is greater than the expected number of 
trips; see Greene, 2007). We experimented with estimating negative binomial models corrected 
for on-site sampling, but these models failed to converge. Computational difficulties with this 
variant of the negative binomial model are also reported by Haab and McConnell (2003) and 
Alberini and Reppas (2005). We therefore restrict attention to the Poisson model corrected for 
on-site sampling. Alberini and Reppas (2005) suggest that using a Poisson model in lieu of a 
negative binomial does not bias the estimates of the coefficients, even when the negative bino-
mial model would have been the correct distribution to use. 
15 In this paper, we assume away the problem of exact recall of the number of trips taken in the year 
prior to the survey. Standard econometric arguments (see for example Bound and Krueger, 1991) 
show that as long as the recall error is expressed as a classical measurement error, the estimates of 
the regression coefficients are unbiased, although less efficient than if one was able to observe the 
true number of trips. Problems arise when the measurement error is correlated with the number 
of true trips, but we have no reason to believe that such a problem might be present here. 
16 We have argued in Alberini et al. (in press) that the Lagoon of Marano and the Po Delta serve 
as substitutes for the Venice Lagoon for fishing and hunting purposes. These locales, however, 
log ( )h yi
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We also examine how the demand for trips is shifted by individual characte-
ristics. In sum, our candidate regressors are price per trip, income, a gender dum-
my, a dummy indicating whether the respondent is a retired person (which cap-
tures the availability of time17), age, a college education dummy, and a dummy 
for whether the respondent keeps his or her boat at a private marina (MARINA), 
which we regard as a measure of commitment to boating. 
4. Results 
In what follows, we report results based on the Poisson model with the correc-
tion for on-site sampling (eqns. (11)-(12)) and λ specified as an exponential func-
tion of the regressors, as in eqn. (10). 
Table 3 displays the results of three alternative specifications, which differ in 
the measure of cost per trip used. Specification (I) enters the out-of-pocket cost of 
a trip, specification (II) the full cost per trip at the full wage rate, and specification 
(III) the full cost per trip at one-third of the wage rate. Income is entered separa-
tely in all three specifications.
The coefficient on price per trip is negative and significant, as expected, in all 
specifications, regardless of the measure of price used. The three coefficients on 
price are reasonable, and imply price elasticities of trips of -0.04, -0.03, and -0.04, 
respectively. In turn, these mean that for the average boater in our sample it takes 
a price increase of about 60% for expected trips to decline by one. This effect is 
consistent across the three specifications of the model. 
In all three specifications, household income enters in the regression with a 
negative sign, and the coefficient is significant, even in specifications (II) and (III), 
where income is already factored into the price per trip. Males take about 25-26% 
more trips than female respondents, all else the same. By contrast, despite their 
free time, retired persons take 36-41% fewer trips than all others, a result that pe-
rhaps is due to the fact that they limit boating to a shorter period in the summer. 
In spite of this, age is positively and significantly related to the number of trips. 
We find that the type of boat owned and its engine power-to-length characteristi-
cs do significantly influence the number of trips, but the fact that one keeps his or 
her boat at a privately owned marina does not. We also do not find any statistical-
ly discernible differences in the number of trips between people that do and do 
not have a college degree. 
are not substitutes for the Venice Lagoon for “pure” boating. Although Marano and the sur-
rounding beach resorts boast about 5000 berths, the usual destination of the boating trips origi-
nating from these marinas is usually the Adriatic Sea, not the Lagoon of Marano.
17 Since we do not have information about our respondents’ discretionary time, in practice this 
dummy captures the full time term employed in Bockstael et al. (1987). Larson and Shaikh 
(2001) note that to be consistent with two budget-models, recreational demand models should 
include the time budget, in addition to the price per trip and money income. 
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Since our likelihood function adjusts for the nature of the sample, the estima-
ted coefficients refer to the population of boaters, and can therefore be used to com-
pute welfare statistics for the population. Unfortunately, at this time we do not 
have information about the average income, age, employment status, etc. for the 
population of Lagoon of Venice boaters. We therefore compute the welfare measu-
Table 3 – Poisson regressions with truncation and endogenous stratification 
(t-statistics in parentheses)
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res for each person in our sample using the population coefficients, assuming that 
the individual characteristics (income, age, etc.) of the persons in the sample are 
similar to those of the population of Lagoon boaters. 
At the current prices (in the absence of limits), the average consumer surplus 
in the sample is €2045, €3290, and €2442, based on the results of specification (I), 
(II) and (III), respectively18. Each of the model specifications implies that imposing 
the speed limits would reduce the expected number of trips by about two trips19, 
for welfare changes of €608 (standard error around this estimate €82), €790 (s.e. 
€110), and €677 (s.e. €94) in specifications (I), (II), and (III), respectively. Assu-
ming conservatively that the number of Lagoon boaters using private marinas on 
the mainland side of the Lagoon is about 8500, the welfare losses due the imposi-
tion of the speed limits range from €5.165 to €6.718 million a year20.
5. Discussion and Conclusions
We have estimated single-site travel cost models of boating trips into the La-
goon of Venice to study the possible welfare losses due to the imposition of speed 
limit, one of the policies currently in place to reduce wave motion in the Lagoon. 
The latter is responsible for damages to environmentally sensitive areas and to 
buildings. 
Data limitations prevent us from using econometric equations deriving from 
two-constraint theoretical model, so we estimated conventional models with the 
full price of a trip (out-of-pocket costs plus the value of time) and, for good mea-
sure, a model where out-of-pocket costs and income are entered separately. Esti-
mation results, predicted welfare change and predicted number of trips with and 
without speed limits are remarkably similar across these alternative approaches. 
Our calculations indicate that establishing the speed limits almost triples the cost 
of a boating trip, and our models in turn indicate that such increase reduces an-
nul trips by two. The corresponding change in surplus is €608-790 a year, so even 
conservative estimates of the number of boaters using private marinas on the 
mainland side of the Lagoon (about 8500) result in relatively large losses of wel-
fare on the order of €5.165 to 6.718 million per year. These losses must be added 
with losses experienced by other categories (e.g., the marina industry; water taxi 
18 A more refined measure of the consumer surplus per year can be calculated by subtracting the 
fixed costs. We estimate the fixed costs to be about €1240 a year. This figure is calculated as 
follows. Boat owners who keep their boats at private marinas pay on average €1200 a year for 
their berth. Since 70% of our sample keep their boats at private marinas, the average over the 
entire sample is €(1200×0.70)=€840. We add about €400 a year for maintenance and insure to 
obtain €1240. 
19 The exact change in the average predicted number of trips is 2.02 in specification (I), 1.83 in 
specification (II) and 2.05 in specification (III).
20 The 95% confidence interval around these figures are €3.792-6.537 million, and €4.883-8.553 
million, respectively.
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and commercial boat operators within the city of Venice, etc.), and then compared 
with the monetized benefits of imposing speed limits to conduct a complete cost-
benefit analysis of this policy.
Our welfare loss calculations assume, of course, full compliance to the speed 
limits on the part of the recreational boaters. Facing these welfare losses, and 
given the current penalty structure for violations, should we expect boaters to 
actually obey these speed limits? We reason that a boater will ignore the speed 
limits on a given trip if the welfare loss due to the limits is greater than the ex-
pected penalty, which is the product of the fine times the probability of being 
caught and fined.
The fines for breaking the limits range from €52 to €516, depending on the 
severity of the violation and on the whether the violation occurred in the open 
Lagoon or near urban centers. The prescribed penalty is usually reduced for boa-
ters caught speeding but willing to pay the penalty on the spot. We estimate that 
the average fine is €100 for violations occurring in the open Lagoon, and €155 for 
violations taking place in inner canals, in the city of Venice proper, and near urban 
centers. 
Since the surplus per trip is €230-367 (based on model specifications I and II, 
respectively), and the surplus loss per trip (after adjusting to the speed limits) is 
about €76-99, for violations occurring in the open Lagoon, where the average fine 
is about €100, the likelihood of being caught must be extremely high – greater 
than 0.76 – for the boater to choose to comply with the speed limits. For viola-
tions occurring in inner canals and near urban areas, where the penalty is higher 
(€155), a lower likelihood of being caught (0.49 to 0.64) is sufficient to create the 
incentive to comply with the limits. 
In practice, we believe that the actual likelihood of being caught is much lower 
than these break-even thresholds, especially in the open Lagoon. Given the large 
welfare loss incurred by boaters and the current monitoring levels, it would appear 
that the current fines and enforcement level are inadequate to ensure that boaters 
will obey the speed limits and limit the damages to environmentally sensitive areas. 
Stepped-up enforcement – which raise the cost of the policy –and increased fines 
may be necessary to realize reductions in wave motion. Indeed, at least in theory, 
the ordinances allow the authorities to impound the boat and initiate penal pro-
ceedings for “environmental damage” against boat owners responsible for severe 
violations of the speed limits. These considerations should play a role in the bene-
fit-cost calculus, and in the design of an effective speed limit policy.
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Appendix 
Figure A.1 – The Lagoon of Venice and the Adriatic Sea coastline near Venice.
